Immanentism

Themes: Apologetics, Critique, Philosophy, Society

“If there is an intellectual direction in the culture that has developed over the last few centuries it is that which
is rather barbarously labelled ‘immanentism’. That is to say, the phenomenon which at once characterises a culture and sets for Christian theology its central problem is the widely accepted belief that the world can be understood from within itself, and not from any being or principle supposed to operate from without. Examples are to be found everywhere, from the characteristic modern ‘experience’ of being alone in the universe to the brash technocratic optimism that sees in modern knowledge the key to the solution of all problems.” (Colin Gunton, Yesterday and Today, 2-3)

I generally hate generalisations about anything, especially about cultures. But I also (evidently) don’t have a problem with being slightly contrary, so I’ll come out with it and say, I think Our Colin has nailed the cockroach to the wall with this one.
I just wish ‘immanentism’ was slightly easier to pronounce, then I could start accusing all sorts of people of being it.
It certainly seems influential in many Christian attempts to rethink the presentation of the Gospel to our culture (think emergent church), and in the prevalence and brand of eschatology fashionable in theology (think ‘new creation’ rather than ‘heaven’).
You might have to think a while to join the dotted lines, but they are there, and they aren’t that dotty.

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Limitations and Questions

Themes: Ethics, Philosophy

Neither Virtue nor Value seems to provide a completely adequate account of ethics from a Christian standpoint. This should hardly be surprising, considering that both notions depend on theories that are not governed by a Christian understanding of the world. However, we should not be too quick to completely dismiss either of these ethical theories. An adequate and Christian ethical theory will need to capture the insights of both virtue and value ethics, and go further in seeking to explain the nature of morality in theologically centred world.

Virtue Ethics draws our attention to the importance of the Ethical Subject but fails to adequately conceive of that subject as a being in relation to the world, or as a being with an eschatological future – not just a formal Cause.

The concept of ‘Value’ and the Consequentialist ethical tradition is a compass without a magnetic Pole. Judging and Valuing are fruitless activities without an ‘already judged’ End for which to aim. We do not know what to value without knowing what kind of beings we are.

Something more is needed.

And further question needs to be raised,
Ethical discussions generally operate at the level of the individual Ethical Subject. However, our ethical theories are just as often applied to corporate entities – Churches, Businesses, Schools, Universities, and so on.

Can an organisation be an Ethical Person? Does ethics operate differently for corporations than individuals?
We are well aware that we grant the status of ‘Legal Persons’ to Corporations, however, this appears to have developed as a convenient fiction to allow corporations to enjoy property rights, and give individuals civil redress against corporations for tortious actions.
However, it is not clear that we regard corporate entities as Ethical Subjects independently of the actions of their directors and employees. When we think about corporate ethics, are we concerned with the qualities, behaviours, and objectives of the directors and employees, or with the qualities, behaviours, and objectives of the corporation itself?

It may be that individual and corporate ethics will blend into each other to a large degree, yet it may also be productive to remember the potential complexity of the Ethical Subject.

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What is 'Value'?

Themes: Ethics, Philosophy

The term ‘value’ immediately suggests its background: it was raised in the fertile fields of Economic theory. The way for ‘value’ to enter ethical discourse was opened through the influence of 19th century Utilitarian philosophy – itself almost entirely an application of economic principles to ethical theory.

The use of ‘value’ as an ethical term is most prominent within Consequentialist Ethics, although isn’t necessarily restricted to this domain. Unsurprisingly, given the name, Consequentialism places the primary focus of ethical judgement onto the consequences of actions. It regards the end toward which something is directed, the result of an action, as the proper domain of ethics, rather than individual character traits or actions in themselves.
There are a number of different ethical theories under the broad umbrella of Consequentialist Ethics, the most well-known being Utilitarianism. Utilitarianism argues that an action is morally ‘good’ when it results in the greatest amount of ‘utility’ (use, pleasure, preference satisfaction) being generated in the world.
‘Value’ relates to the contribution of a particular object towards achieving a desired outcome. It is a way of breaking down the larger Utilitarian calculus (what result will produce the greatest utility?) into smaller parcels. When we speak about ‘value’ we are assuming the goodness of the outcome we seek, and are now concerned with the ability of this object to help us achieve that outcome. In this way, someone might value a rifle in order to defend his country, or to murder his neighbour. Whether the total end result is good will determine the total ‘goodness’ of the actions, but the usefulness of the object toward that end result will determine its value, its ‘goodness’ within the total list of possible actions.
In this sense, ‘values’ are relative to the end being sought. A hammer might be particularly valuable for building a house, and significantly less valuable for performing neurosurgery. The end result determines the value of all other objects through their relation to that end.
A concept of ‘value’ enables us to speak clearly about something we all do: we prioritise certain ‘goods’ over others. When we form an intention to bring about a result in the world, we also create a structure of relative ‘goods’ things that will help us achieve that end, and we engage in some hierarchical processing of these ‘goods’. ‘Value’ enables us to examine the quantifiable aspects of ethical decisions, in contrast with the ‘qualities of being’ at the core of Virtue Ethics.
As a result Utilitarianism, and ‘value’ language has become dominant in Governmental and corporate contexts. It works well in a pluralist culture where the precise qualities of a virtuous person are not agreed by all parties; where decisions need to be justified with quantifiable data; and where positive economic outcomes are often regarded as equivalent with positive ethical outcomes.
Christians have too frequently baulked at any form of consequentialist ethics, usually reacting against the relative nature of ‘values’. Our Christian intuition is that ethical goods must be rooted in the character of God, and therefore are not subject to change according to circumstance. In addition, some brands of Consequentialism appear to justify actions that Christians find morally outrageous, i.e. it would appear to legitimise the euthanasia of severely disabled people in order to stop them being a drain on the resources of their families or the State.
However, before we hastily back away, it is instructive to note that the New Testament does occasionally employ consequentialist reasoning. For example,

“If your right eye causes you to sin, gouge it out and throw it away. For it is better that you lose one of the parts of your body than for your whole body to be thrown into hell.” (Matt 5:29 HCSB)

or more provocatively,

“You’re not considering that it is to your advantage that one man should die for the people rather than the whole nation perish.”” (John 11:50 HCSB)

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What is a Virtue?

Themes: Ethics, Philosophy

One of the difficult pleasures of thinking through writing is reading back over what you have written.
It’s pleasurable, in that I can see the way in which ideas have coalesced and materialised on the page.
It’s difficult in that I go too far, say too much, and end up disagreeing with myself.

So I’m taking a couple of steps back with our discussion of virtue and values. Not because I disagree with where I was heading, but because I need to go more carefully and clearly.

I’ve been asked to help clarify the meaning of the terms ‘virtue’ and ‘values’ within a corporate ethical environment.
How are these terms distinguished?
How or when would someone apply ‘virtues’ over ‘values’?
What are appropriate virtues or values for a Christian organisation?

These questions lead naturally to the need to formulate a thoroughgoing Christian corporate ethical framework, which is itself part of an overarching explanation of ethical being in a theologically centred world.

I don’t want those dizzying heights to overawe the relatively simple questions I have in front of me. And yet, I do want to get out the ol’ ice-pick and have a swing at Mt Everest.

For now, I’m going back to the beginning. I’m trying to clearly distinguish ‘virtues’ from ‘values’.
Starting with virtues.

Distinguishing Virtues and Values:
The terms ‘virtue’ and ‘value’ represent broadly differing ethical traditions within Western culture. The use of the term ‘virtue’ in ethical judgement predates ‘value’ by at least two millennia, yet the roots of the concept represented by our idea of ‘value’ are almost certainly equally ancient.

The concept of ‘virtue’ within ethics traces its lineage back to the classical Greek philosophy of Aristotle. Through the influence of Greek thought upon early and medieval Christian theologians virtue became the dominant way of talking about ethical behaviour within Christian societies. It is still quite common for people to connect ‘virtue’ with a specifically Christian morality. In contrast, the Bible itself rarely speaks of Christian ethical behaviour using ‘virtue’ language.
The rise of Modernism throughout Europe and its satellite societies brought with it influential alternatives to the ethical concept of ‘virtue’. Throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, ‘virtue’ fell into disuse outside specifically Christian (and more often Catholic) circles. However, ‘Virtue Ethics’ has experienced a significant revival since the 1950’s, particularly in the work of the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre in his work, After Virtue.

What is ‘Virtue’?
Virtue Ethics primarily focusses on the character of the individual – what we call the ‘Ethical Subject’. This is in noted contrast with other ethical theories which tend to focus on either the nature of the action being performed, or the goal to which the action is directed. For Virtue Ethics, an act is virtuous if it follows the pattern of behaviour expected of a Virtuous person. Although that might sound circular, the intent is to place the Ethical Subject at the forefront of our consideration.
Even with this united concern for the Ethical Subject, the question of how virtues themselves are determined has been answered differently by different thinkers. Aristotle set the course of the discussion by observing that every being has a finished form towards which it moves – like an acorn developing into an Oak tree. He argued that Humans are like acorns, in that we too have a finished form towards which we move. Aristotle observed that we grow and develop in understanding of the world and our ability to control ourselves and the environment, and from this he reasoned that the final form of the human must be something very like a Philosopher – capable of reasoning, apprehending the truth, and controlling him or her self (it’s been remarked that this sounds a little self-serving).

For Aristotle then, a Virtue was a way of acting in accordance with our finished form. It is a way of acting in the direction toward which we are growing. It is a virtue of acorns to spread out leaves and put down roots, an acorn that doesn’t get around to doing this isn’t much good. Likewise for people, it is virtuous to use our reason, to control ourselves, to understand our environment, and so on.

Other Virtue Ethicists have broadly adopted Aristotle’s approach, while moving away from his biological determinism. Someone like MacIntyre would argue that the finished form of a human being isn’t written into our DNA but is decided by the cultural community in which we participate. The notion of a ‘virtuous person’ is a product of our complex beliefs, hopes, and dreams about what makes a person complete and truly human. This model of the virtuous person is the ideal toward which we seek to move, and when we act in a way that takes us toward that ideal or is consistent with that ideal, we are being virtuous.

What then is ‘Virtue’? Virtue is a quality of a person’s being. When we speak about virtue we are generally concerned with a particular quality or aspect of Being. When we apply this to a person, we generally mean something about his or her ‘character’, his or her moral mode of being in the world.
For now, let’s envisage virtue as being something akin to ‘good character traits’.

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Virtue and Values III

Themes: Ethics, Philosophy, Random

Being Virtuous is a dead end profession.
It doesn’t have any future,
not only that, it’s got no ‘go-forward’, no ‘oomph’.
It doesn’t exactly reach out and grab you by the kidneys, you know…

Those who argue that virtue is its own reward are already giving the game away. For an ethical system to work, there needs to be something to motivate the average Punter to Be Good – even if it’s just that being good is good.

Ethics is concerned with Subjects and Actions, or more properly put: Ethics is concerned with Subjects in Action. Not only does the Ethical Subject only become the Subject of Ethics when he or she is faced with a decision, the Ethical Subject does not act at all without desires, goals, hopes, and plans. In short, just as the Subject conceives of him or her self along a teleological axis, so Ethics needs a telos.

Of course, Aristotle was aware of this and solved it (to his own satisfaction) by locating the telos in the Subject’s Formal Cause – whether that works through genetics, or some other weird ontological reverse causality. However, the chief problem is that the Formal Cause is attractive in precisely the wrong way.

The Formal Cause attracts Being like a gravitational pull, almost as though we were being sucked into a Virtue-shaped jelly mold.
However, unfortunately for Aristotle and me, the Good doesn’t Suck.
(seems obvious when you say it…)

Our experience of being Ethical subjects is not one in which we are drawn toward the Good in the same way that an Acorn is drawn toward being an Oak.

If Aristotle’s notion of causality is laid aside and Virtue is located instead within patterns of moral excellence enmeshed in particular cultures, then the attractive power of Virtue either becomes virtually inexplicable, or seems to really be an enlightened pragmatics. The first is unacceptable, the second is just a more noble sounding consequentialism.

Precisely how we are drawn to the Good we will leave undefined for now.

As if all that isn’t enough, I’ve got a few more anti-Virtuous remarks to get off my chest.

Later.

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Virtue and Values II

Themes: Ethics, Philosophy

The Virtue of Virtues

What makes ‘Virtue’ a good way of thinking about ethics?

Ethics, like any discipline of thought, finds itself caught up in the most fundamental philosophical problem. How to hold together the individual, particular nature of things, while maintaining them as part of a unifying structure.
- The problem of Universals

Ethics participates in this struggle, in that an ethical theory needs to account for the particularity of each ethical subject and situation, while providing normative guidance that applies universally.

Most, if not all, ethical theories tend towards the Universal. They seek to formulate one rule or principle which undergirds all our thinking about what ought to be. In many ways, the core distinctions between ethical theories arise from where they locate this Universal.

A theory of ethics centred on Virtue, holds out the possibility of balancing the Universal and Particular dimensions of decision by connecting making the Universal (a Virtuous quality) operative within a Particular ethical subject. Virtue ethics is not primarily concerned with the nature of ‘Justice’ or ‘Courage’ but with the patterns of moral excellence exhibited by a particularly just or courageous individual. The precise manner in which an individual is just or courageous will be unique, but it will be an unique expression of the Universals ‘Justice’ and ‘Courage’.

Certainly, the relation of Particular and Universal is the matter of continued philosophical debate, but at least an ethical theory derived from Virtue seeks to do justice to both.

All this discussion of Universal and Particular, is more easily understood in Ethics through the tension between ‘Objectivism’ and ‘Relativism’. I think these are unhelpful terms, however, a theory too concerned with the Particular will generally be relativistic – it will struggle to provide ethical guidance across a range of ethical situation. Virtues are generally understood to be objective goods, and therefore appear to avoid falling into a relativistic trap.

It is this attention to the individual that has seen the resurrection of Virtue Ethics throughout the 20th Century. It is certainly a refreshing and helpful turn of events. The de-ontological and teleological ethical theories that had come to dominate Modernist thought suffer greatly from a tendency to obscure or obliterate the place of the individual.

However, I’m not sure that Virtue ethics can deliver on everything it promises.

Next,
Being Virtuous isn’t Enough.

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